One of the principles of geopolitics is that geography or location of a nation determines its behaviour. This is especially so when a small nation is surrounded by large and powerful neighbours. Nepal is a landlocked country surrounded by two strong nations jostling for domination. Therefore Nepal has to have a carefully crafted foreign policy for handling its geopolitical setting.

India and Nepal have traditionally been allies. India has always stood by Nepal whenever there has been a crisis. In terms of catering to economic needs of Nepal, India has been the select route for movement of all goods. Kolkata port caters for all sea traffic for Nepal. Oil and other economic requirements also move from India.

Nepalese Gurkhas have always been part of the Indian army and there exists a close knit retired community with strong ties to India. The Indo-Nepal border is open and there is almost free movement of people. The border is the responsibility of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). When the Indian Prime Minister visited Nepal recently, he went with a host of goodies. Projects from India, in limbo for twenty years or more, got a boost. He clearly spelt out India’s willingness to go an extra mile for its neighbours. Thus India has quietly been influencing internal politics in Nepal.

India has, for the third time (earlier was in 1969 and 1989) attempted to force Nepal to change its internal policies by blocking the movement of essential commodities. It worked earlier, however with changing times, perceptions, governments and developments on the Nepal- China border it is possible that this time India could have made an erroneous decision.

China has always wanted Nepal to be in its sphere of influence. It has therefore been making inroads into Nepal. However it has maintained a distance from the ongoing political turmoil. Some areas of China’s influence that have perturbed India’s security establishment include the increasing number of China study centres mushrooming in southern Nepal and its infrastructure development in the western part of Nepal, bordering Uttarakhand.

Western Nepal is adjacent to the Chinese claim areas in Uttarakhand including the Barahoti bowl and the Nepal claim area of Kalapani. The roads being developed move north-south from the Chinese border and are close to the Indo-Nepal border. China has opened at least 22 China study centres in the Terai region of Nepal, close to the Indian border. These have Chinese nationals as residents. Indian security agencies claim that these are visited by Maoists from India and are also centres for espionage. China has in recent times enhanced military cooperation with Nepal.

India’s strong action of restricting movement of essential supplies to compel Nepal to amend its constitution to meet the aspirations of Terai residents has not gone down well. Nepal has turned to China to meet its shortfall of oil and China has willingly agreed. Further Nepal is today governed by a leftist president and a leftist prime minister, which principally takes them closer to China. Thus the future could witness enhanced Chinese presence and influence in the nation and India’s role diminishing.

One of the major advantages geopolitically for a country like Nepal is to play one big brother against the other and in the end gain the best from both. The earlier Bangladesh government did it and planned to offer berthing facilities to China in Chittagong, so also the previous Sri Lankan government. It was always done as a warning to India, and we reacted. We cannot allow Nepal to go the same way and offer military facilities to China; the first blockade occurred because Nepal closed the Indian military mission.

Strategically, Nepal is a buffer between the two countries. A common school of thought on the manner in which Nepal would be involved in a China- India conflict is that China could and would use Nepal territory or air space to strike at India, with or without permission. Internationally such action would be criticised. However, recent Chinese action in the South China Sea clearly indicates that China is not concerned about world opinion, especially where its national interests are concerned. However, a friendly Nepal, with close Indian links could be a deterrent for such unilateral action.

Chinese-constructed roads in western Nepal would enable logistics support to advancing Chinese troops into India, as roads in Indian territory are still non-existent. Using Nepal airspace would enhance the range of Chinese aircraft to engage targets well within India’s depth. The closest approach to India’s eastern vulnerability, the Chicken’s neck, or the strategic corridor to the north east, is shortest at the Nepal-Bangladesh border.

India should realise that it strategically needs to be back in the driver’s seat in Nepal, rebuild bridges and ensure that Nepal continues to be India’s close ally. India needs to be a supportive big brother rather than a dominating one. We may have been hasty or may have pushed too fast or even ignored other alternatives which could compel Nepal to amend its constitution. But we chose to hit them economically and forced them closer to China.

For India it would be a strategic disaster if Nepal ever goes into collaboration with China on matters military. Normally the first visits by a new prime minister and president on assuming office determine where the nation’s priorities lie. The Nepalese Foreign Minister’s first visit was to India with a request. We turned him down and they approached China. For Nepal’s new President and Prime Minister it is still early days, but my thought is that if they visit China first it would be another blow to our pride.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)